Latest Judgement

1. Section 13B(1) conditions the presentation of the first motion on living separately for at least one year;
2. Section 13B(2) prescribes a six-month waiting period between the first and second motions, often referred to as the cooling-off period; and
3. Section 14(1) contains a proviso allowing courts to condone delays in presentation of a petition, where delay causes “exceptional hardship” or results from “exceptional depravity.”
   Traditionally, Section 13B has been treated as a complete code that cannot be supplemented by Section 14(1). This orthodox position held that neither the one-year separation period nor the six-month waiting period could be waived except, perhaps, under the narrowest of circumstances.

1. The one-year separation requirement under Section 13B(1) is not mandatory but directory and may be waived in appropriate cases by applying the proviso to Section 14(1) of the HMA. The purpose of this interpretation is to prevent parties from being forced to remain in unworkable marital relationships unduly, particularly when there is free and informed consent to divorce.
2. Waiver of the one-year period does not preclude the waiver of the six-month cooling-off period under Section 13B(2); both periods are to be considered independently and may be waived where circumstances so justify.
3. The proviso to Section 14(1)—historically invoked in contested matters for condonation of delay—can apply to Section 13B(1). This approach aligns with a purposive interpretation that ensures the legislative intent of facilitating amicable divorce is not frustrated by rigid timelines.
4. Waiver is not automatic. A court must be satisfied that exceptional hardship to the petitioners or exceptional depravity on the part of the respondent justifies invoking the proviso.
   Thus, while the High Court acknowledged the value of statutory timelines, it rejected the notion that such timelines must be enforced mechanically in all cases.

1. The decision rests on a purposive construction of the HMA, giving effect to legislative intent without undermining statutorily prescribed safeguards. Whereas Section 13B reflects a policy favouring reflection and reconciliation, Section 14(1) provides a mechanism to avoid undue hardship where adherence to procedural timelines defeats substantive rights.
2. The Full Bench’s reliance on the directory nature of the separation requirement is consistent with the Supreme Court’s approach toward the cooling-off period in Amardeep Singh v. Harveen Kaur, where the Court held that the six-month waiting period is not an absolute bar to immediate divorce if there is no possibility of reconciliation. Under this broader interpretive umbrella, statutory requirements in matrimonial matters may be waived in circumstances where adherence would cause greater injustice than boon.
3. The Court’s emphasis on consent as the core requirement underscores a shift from procedural formality to substantive justice, prioritising individual autonomy and dignity.

1. Judicial Discretion Enhanced: Family Courts and High Courts now have clear authority to waive statutory timelines, subject to rigorous judicial scrutiny of circumstances.
2. Autonomy in Marital Dissolution: Couples genuinely wishing to dissolve marriage by mutual consent will no longer be compelled to satisfy rigid temporal thresholds where such compliance serves no constructive purpose.
3. Robust Interpretation of Section 14(1): The judgment validates the application of Section 14(1)’s proviso beyond delay-based condonation, extending it to timeline waivers in mutual consent contexts.
4. Safeguards Against Misuse: By insisting on clear proof of hardship or depravity, the Court ensures procedural flexibility does not lead to frivolous or capricious divorce filings.

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