When Eighteen Is Not The End
WHEN EIGHTEEN IS NOT THE END: THE CHHATTISGARH HIGH COURT ON DISABILITY, MAINTENANCE AND THE LIMITS OF MAJORITY
This article has been researched and written by Advocate Aarun Chanda, who practices divorce law in Mumbai and Pune. It is intended solely for academic purposes and should not be construed as legal advice. The views expressed are personal. Readers are encouraged to consult a qualified lawyer or advocate specializing in divorce cases for professional legal guidance.
There is a particular moment in every Family Court matter when the file stops being a collection of pleadings and starts looking like somebody’s life.
I was reminded of that recently while sitting in chambers with a maintenance brief spread across my desk. The usual papers were there—income particulars, school expenses, medical bills, bank statements and the inevitable allegations about who had failed to discharge which responsibility.
But one sentence in the order caught my attention.
“Maintenance till the age of eighteen.”
It looked harmless enough.
After all, eighteen is a familiar legal milestone. A child becomes a major. The law recognises adulthood. The person acquires new rights and responsibilities. In ordinary circumstances, therefore, a court may quite naturally look at eighteen as the point at which a parent’s statutory obligation towards a minor child comes to an end.
But what happens when the child suffers from a disability so profound that turning eighteen does not make him independent?
Does a birthday change a person’s ability to earn?
Does the law expect autism, intellectual disability, severe mental illness or another disabling condition to disappear merely because the calendar has moved forward?
The Chhattisgarh High Court has now provided an important answer.
In Raghav Lahre v. Bharat Lahre, decided on 24 August 2026, the Court held that the mere attainment of majority cannot automatically terminate maintenance payable to a child suffering from a physical or mental abnormality or disability who remains unable to maintain himself. The Court directed continuation of maintenance beyond the age of eighteen unless it is established that the person has become capable of maintaining himself and earning his livelihood.
For those of us practising matrimonial and family law, the judgment deserves considerably more attention than the headline might suggest.
It is not merely a case about an autistic child.
It is a case about the difference between legal adulthood and functional independence.
And that distinction is fundamental.
1. THE CHILD BEHIND THE CASE
The petitioner, Raghav Lahre, was a young boy suffering from Autism Spectrum Disorder and Speech Disorder. The material before the Court indicated that he required specialised education, continuous care and medical attention.
His mother approached the Family Court seeking maintenance under Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
The Family Court at Durg awarded maintenance of ₹7,000 per month.
So far, so good.
But the order contained a qualification: the maintenance was to continue only until the child attained majority.
The child, through his mother, challenged that limitation before the High Court.
The grievance was not merely about the amount.
The deeper question was whether the Family Court could, at the outset, declare that the maintenance obligation would automatically disappear on the child’s eighteenth birthday despite the child’s disability and apparent inability to maintain himself independently.
The Chhattisgarh High Court, presided over by Chief Justice Ramesh Sinha, answered that question in the negative.
The Court did not, however, increase the monthly amount.
It found no patent illegality or perversity in the Family Court’s assessment of ₹7,000 per month and therefore declined to interfere with the quantum in revisional jurisdiction.
But it found considerable substance in the challenge to the automatic age-based termination.
That distinction is important.
The judgment did not say that every claim for maintenance must necessarily be enhanced.
Nor did it say that every person with a disability is automatically entitled to maintenance for life.
It said something more precise—and legally more significant:
The right cannot be terminated merely because the clock has struck eighteen.
THE REAL ISSUE: WHAT DOES EIGHTEEN ACTUALLY MEAN?
Family lawyers are accustomed to legal ages.
Eighteen for majority.
Twenty-one for certain statutory purposes.
Twenty-five in some contexts.
The law frequently uses age as a convenient dividing line.
There is nothing inherently wrong with that.
The difficulty arises when a statutory age-limit is applied mechanically to circumstances for which the legislature itself has created an exception.
Section 125 CrPC is one such provision.
The provision is often popularly described as a mechanism for securing maintenance for wives, children and parents who are unable to maintain themselves.
But Section 125 does not simply stop at the word “child”.
It contains a specific statutory recognition of a major child who, because of physical or mental abnormality or injury, is unable to maintain himself or herself.
That qualification is crucial.
The law itself therefore recognises that childhood and dependency are not always coterminous.
A person may become a major in the eyes of civil law while continuing to remain dependent in every meaningful economic and functional sense.
The Chhattisgarh High Court’s decision is therefore best understood not as creating a new category of maintenance, but as insisting that an existing statutory exception must not be defeated by a mechanical application of the general rule.
2. THE LAW HAS ALREADY RECOGNISED THIS DISTINCTION
This is where the judgment becomes particularly interesting.
Section 125 CrPC is essentially a provision of social justice.
It is designed to prevent destitution and vagrancy and to ensure that persons who are legally or morally entitled to support are not left without the basic means of sustenance.
The Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasised that maintenance provisions must receive an interpretation consistent with their social-welfare purpose.
At the same time, the Supreme Court has also cautioned that the statutory conditions governing maintenance cannot simply be ignored.
In Abhilasha v. Parkash, (2020) 14 SCC 304, the Supreme Court examined the entitlement of a major daughter under Section 125 CrPC and emphasised the statutory limitations applicable to claims by major children.
That decision is important precisely because it demonstrates the other side of the principle: majority ordinarily matters, unless the statutory framework provides a basis for continuation.
Section 125 itself supplies that basis where a major child suffers from physical or mental abnormality or injury and is unable to maintain himself or herself.
Thus, the legal question is not:
“Has the child turned eighteen?”
The more meaningful question is:
“After attaining eighteen, is the person actually capable of maintaining himself?”
That is the question the Chhattisgarh High Court brought into focus.
3. A BIRTHDAY IS NOT A MEDICAL ASSESSMENT
This, to my mind, is the most humane aspect of the judgment.
A birthday is a calendar event.
Disability is a question of fact.
The two cannot be treated as interchangeable.
A child with autism does not become economically independent because the date on the calendar changes.
A young person with a severe intellectual disability does not suddenly acquire employability because he has received a birthday certificate.
A person requiring lifelong assistance cannot be treated as self-sufficient merely because he has crossed a statutory age threshold.
The Court therefore correctly shifted the focus from chronological age to functional capacity.
It observed that the mere attainment of majority cannot, by itself, result in automatic cessation of maintenance where the child suffers from a physical or mental abnormality or disability and is unable to maintain himself. The relevant consideration is whether, after attaining majority, the person is capable of maintaining himself and earning his livelihood.
That approach avoids both extremes.
It avoids treating eighteen as an absolute cut-off.
But it also avoids declaring maintenance permanent irrespective of circumstances.
4. THE JUDGMENT DOES NOT CREATE LIFETIME MAINTENANCE AUTOMATICALLY
This point deserves emphasis because legal reporting often compresses nuanced judgments into attractive headlines.
The Chhattisgarh High Court did not hold that every disabled child must receive maintenance forever.
That would be an overstatement.
The Court held that maintenance cannot be made to cease automatically upon attainment of majority.
If, after attaining majority, the person becomes capable of maintaining himself and earning his livelihood, the position can be reconsidered.
In other words, the Court replaced an automatic rule with an evidence-based determination.
That is a much more defensible legal position.
The father is not permanently barred from seeking modification or cessation.
But he cannot obtain cessation merely by pointing to the child’s eighteenth birthday.
There must be evidence regarding the person’s actual condition and capacity.
The Court expressly directed continuation of the maintenance unless it is established that the petitioner has become capable of maintaining himself and earning his livelihood.
That is an important safeguard.
5. MAINTENANCE IS ABOUT NEED, NOT PUNISHMENT
Another aspect of the judgment deserves attention.
Maintenance proceedings are sometimes unfortunately approached as though they are contests between two adversaries, with one party trying to extract money from the other.
That approach misses the very nature of maintenance law.
Maintenance is not a punishment imposed upon the earning parent.
Nor is it charity.
It is a statutory mechanism for ensuring that a person who cannot reasonably support himself is not abandoned to destitution.
The quantum therefore depends upon several factors: the needs of the claimant, the financial capacity of the person liable to maintain, the standard of living, the nature of the dependency and the surrounding circumstances.
The Family Court in Raghav’s case fixed the amount at ₹7,000 per month.
The High Court did not find sufficient ground to interfere with that determination in revision.
But the Court separated the question of how much from the question of how long.
That separation is legally sound.
A court may be correct in fixing ₹7,000.
It does not follow that the same court is entitled to declare, years in advance, that the amount must automatically disappear on a particular birthday.
6. DISABILITY CANNOT BE REDUCED TO A PERCENTAGE
There is another lesson here for Family Courts.
Disability is not merely a percentage written on a certificate.
Two persons having the same percentage of disability may have completely different functional capacities.
One may be able to work independently.
Another may require constant supervision.
One may be capable of earning.
Another may require lifelong assistance.
The actual question, therefore, must be functional.
Can the person communicate independently?
Can he travel independently?
Can he manage money?
Can he obtain and retain employment?
Can he perform basic daily activities?
Does he require continuing therapy?
Does he require specialised education?
Does he require supervision or assistance?
What is his realistic earning capacity?
These are questions of evidence.
And they cannot be answered merely by looking at the person’s date of birth.
7. THE RIGHTS OF PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES ACT STRENGTHENS THE PHILOSOPHY
The judgment also sits comfortably within the broader legislative movement represented by the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016.
The modern disability-rights framework does not treat persons with disabilities merely as objects of welfare.
It recognises dignity, equality, participation, accessibility and inclusion.
That legislative philosophy matters when courts interpret family-law provisions concerning dependency.
The concept of disability has evolved.
The law no longer asks only:
“What is wrong with this person?”
It increasingly asks:
“What barriers prevent this person from participating equally in society?”
That shift is important in maintenance cases.
Economic dependency may itself be the consequence of social, educational and functional barriers created by disability.
A child requiring specialised schooling, therapy and continuing assistance may incur expenses that do not disappear at eighteen.
Indeed, in some cases, the financial burden may become greater after school because the person may require vocational training, supported employment, assisted living or continuing supervision.
A rigid eighteenth-birthday cut-off would therefore ignore the lived reality of disability.
8. THE FAMILY COURT’S RESPONSIBILITY
The judgment also sends an important message to Family Courts.
Orders concerning maintenance should be carefully drafted.
A Family Court may certainly determine that maintenance is payable during minority where the statutory conditions warrant it.
But where the record establishes a physical or mental abnormality or disability affecting the person’s ability to maintain himself, the Court must be cautious before inserting a mechanical termination clause.
The proper approach is to recognise the statutory exception and leave future entitlement to be determined on the basis of the person’s actual circumstances.
This is particularly important because Family Court litigation is often prolonged.
A child may be fourteen when the order is passed.
He may be eighteen several years later.
His condition may improve.
It may remain unchanged.
His ability to work may develop.
Or it may become clear that independent employment is simply unrealistic.
The court cannot know the future with mathematical certainty.
What it can do is ensure that the law does not prejudge the future.
That is precisely what the Chhattisgarh High Court has done.
9. A NARROW JUDGMENT WITH A WIDE PRINCIPLE
At first glance, Raghav Lahre may appear to be a narrow maintenance decision involving autism.
I believe it is broader.
Its underlying principle applies to the interpretation of several family-law situations where a legal milestone risks obscuring a human reality.
Law frequently creates categories.
i. Minor.
ii. Major.
iii. Dependent.
iv. Independent.
v. Disabled.
vi. Able-bodied.
vii. Earning.
viii. Non-earning.
But human beings do not always fit neatly into these boxes.
The responsibility of a constitutional court is sometimes to ensure that the categories remain servants of justice rather than substitutes for it.
The eighteenth birthday has legal significance.
But it cannot become a legal fiction that erases disability.
10. THE BURDEN OF PROOF AND FUTURE PROCEEDINGS
There is also a practical consequence.
Once maintenance continues beyond majority on the basis of disability and inability to maintain oneself, a future dispute about cessation will necessarily require evidence.
A parent seeking cessation cannot merely say:
“My child is now eighteen.”
That is no longer enough in the circumstances contemplated by the judgment.
The relevant evidence may include medical assessments, educational records, vocational capability, employment status, actual earnings and the person’s ability to live independently.
Conversely, the person claiming continued maintenance cannot assume that disability alone will forever settle the matter.
The continuing inability to maintain oneself remains significant.
This is why the judgment is balanced.
It protects genuine dependency without converting disability into an irrebuttable presumption of permanent financial entitlement.
11. THE DIGNITY PRINCIPLE
There is a deeper constitutional idea underneath all of this.
Article 21 of the Constitution has long been understood as protecting a life of dignity, not merely biological existence.
For a person who cannot independently sustain himself because of disability, financial support can sometimes be an essential component of that dignity.
The law must therefore be careful before treating dependency as though it were a personal failure.
A disabled person’s inability to earn is not necessarily a consequence of laziness.
Sometimes it is the direct consequence of a condition that affects communication, cognition, mobility, social interaction or independent living.
To say that maintenance ends automatically at eighteen in such a case would effectively convert a legal milestone into a sentence of economic vulnerability.
The Chhattisgarh High Court has refused to do that.
12. WHAT THE JUDGMENT REALLY TELLS PARENTS
There is also a message here for parents.
A child with a disability is not financially independent merely because he has crossed the age of majority.
Parents may have to think differently about adulthood.
The question may no longer be:
“When will my child turn eighteen?”
It may have to become:
“What support will my child need to live with dignity?”
That may include education.
i. Therapy.
ii. Medical treatment.
iii. Vocational training.
iv. Supported employment.
v. Accommodation.
vi. Transportation.
vii. Supervision.
And, sometimes, lifelong financial support.
Family law must be capable of recognising that reality.
13. WHAT THE JUDGMENT REALLY TELLS FAMILY COURTS
For judges and practitioners, the lesson is perhaps even simpler:
Do not confuse majority with independence.
When the statutory exception applies, the court must examine the person’s actual ability to maintain himself.
The determination must be evidence-based.
The quantum must be assessed according to need and capacity.
And the duration must not be curtailed by a mechanical formula that ignores disability.
The High Court’s decision is therefore not an invitation to dispense with statutory requirements.
It is a reminder to apply them correctly.
14. A HUMANE READING OF MAINTENANCE LAW
After years of appearing before Family Courts, I have learned that some of the most important legal questions arrive disguised as very ordinary questions.
Who will pay the school fees?
Who will pay for the medicines?
Who will pay the rent?
Who will pay for therapy?
Who will look after the child when the mother is no longer able to do everything herself?
Behind each of these questions lies a larger question of responsibility.
Maintenance law exists because family relationships carry obligations that cannot always be reduced to contracts or commercial calculations.
The law recognises that some people cannot sustain themselves.
The law therefore steps in.
And where disability makes dependency continue beyond childhood, the law must be capable of continuing with it.
CONCLUSION: EIGHTEEN IS A LEGAL MILESTONE, NOT A CURE
The most important contribution of Raghav Lahre v. Bharat Lahre is its insistence on something remarkably simple:
A person does not become economically independent merely because he becomes legally adult.
The Chhattisgarh High Court has not abolished the significance of majority.
It has placed majority in its proper context.
For an ordinary child capable of becoming self-sufficient, eighteen may mark the end of statutory maintenance under the applicable provision.
For a person suffering from a physical or mental abnormality or disability who remains incapable of maintaining himself, the inquiry cannot end with the date of birth.
It must continue with the evidence.
That is the essence of the judgment.
And perhaps there is a broader lesson for all of us who practise family law.
Courts deal in dates, statutes and legal categories.
But families live in years, circumstances and human realities.
A judge can calculate a child’s age in seconds.
The law, however, must sometimes take considerably longer to determine whether that child can actually stand on his own feet.
The Chhattisgarh High Court has rightly reminded us that majority is a legal status; independence is a matter of fact.
And when disability prevents independence, the law cannot simply look at the calendar and walk away.
After all, disability does not disappear at midnight on an eighteenth birthday.
Neither should dignity.
Seeking expert legal guidance?- Contact The Divorce Law Firm today.
