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This article has been researched and written by Advocate Aarun Chanda, who practices divorce law in Mumbai and Pune. It is intended solely for academic purposes and should not be construed as legal advice. The views expressed are personal. Readers are encouraged to consult a qualified lawyer or advocate specializing in divorce cases for professional legal guidance.

A Judicial Balancing of Statutory Protection, Residential Dignity and Practical Justice
Abstract
The right of a woman to reside in a shared household under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005, has generated considerable judicial discussion, particularly concerning the distinction between a right to residence and a right to reside in a particular property. Section 17 recognises the statutory right of an aggrieved woman to reside in the shared household irrespective of her title or beneficial interest in the property. Section 19, however, provides the court with a range of remedies, including the power under Section 19(1)(f) to direct the respondent to secure same-level alternate accommodation or pay rent for such accommodation. This article examines whether alternate accommodation can lawfully be granted in lieu of physical residence in the shared household. It analyses the statutory scheme and the judicial approach inSatish Chander Ahuja v. Sneha Ahuja, Rajnesh v. Neha, Sabah Sami Khan v. Adnan Sami Khan, and the recent decision of the Delhi High Court in Reena Grover v. Ramesh Grover. The article argues that the right conferred by Section 17 is a right to secure and dignified residence and does not, in every circumstance, translate into an indefeasible right to occupy one particular property. At the same time, alternate accommodation must be genuine, available, secure and of the same level; otherwise, the statutory protection becomes illusory.
Keywords:Domestic Violence Act, right of residence, shared household, alternate accommodation, Section 17, Section 19, matrimonial home, residence order, Satish Chander Ahuja, Rajnesh v. Neha.
1. A QUESTION THAT USUALLY BEGINS WITH A HOUSE
There is a peculiar feature of matrimonial litigation: marriages may take years to build, but matrimonial disputes can sometimes be reduced to a surprisingly precise question—“Who gets the house?”
I have seen this happen repeatedly in my practice before the Family Courts and the High Courts.
At some stage in the proceedings, the allegations of cruelty, emotional abuse, financial hardship and irretrievable breakdown temporarily disappear behind a floor plan.
Counsel begins pointing to the first floor.
The opposite counsel points to the second.
Someone produces a photograph of the drawing room.
Another produces an electricity bill.
And before long, the courtroom is discussing square footage with the seriousness usually reserved for constitutional questions.
But behind this seemingly simple property dispute lies an important question of statutory interpretation:
When a wife claims a right of residence under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005, must the court necessarily put her back into the very property in which she claims a right to reside, or can the court secure that right by directing the husband to provide suitable alternate accommodation?
The answer, in my view, is clear from the statutory scheme.
Yes, alternate accommodation can satisfy the statutory right of residence in an appropriate case.
But that answer must immediately be qualified.
The alternate accommodation cannot be a legal fiction. It must provide the woman with accommodation of the same level, and the court must be satisfied that the statutory protection has genuinely been secured.
The law protects residence.
It does not necessarily make one particular address sacrosanct.
2. SECTION 17: THE STATUTORY RIGHT OF RESIDENCE
The starting point must necessarily be Section 17 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005.
Section 17(1) provides that every woman in a domestic relationship shall have the right to reside in the shared household, whether or not she has any right, title or beneficial interest in the same.
Section 17(2) further protects the aggrieved woman against eviction or exclusion from the shared household except in accordance with the procedure established by law.
The provision was deliberately enacted in broad language.
The legislature was conscious that women in matrimonial relationships may reside in properties in which they have no ownership interest whatsoever.
The statutory right was therefore separated from title.
That was an important legislative development.
A woman need not produce a sale deed in her name before invoking the protection of the residence provisions.
But one must not make the opposite mistake either.
The statutory recognition of a right of residence does not automatically mean that the woman acquires an indefeasible right to occupy a particular property forever.
The distinction between a right of residence and a right to insist upon a particular residence becomes particularly important when Section 17 is read together with Section 19.
3. SECTION 19 SUPPLIES THE ANSWER
Section 19 is the operative provision.
After being satisfied that domestic violence has taken place, the Magistrate may pass a residence order.
Section 19(1)(a) permits the court to restrain the respondent from dispossessing or disturbing the possession of the aggrieved person from the shared household.
Other clauses permit the court to direct removal of the respondent, restrict his entry into portions of the shared household, or prohibit alienation or encumbrance of the premises.
But Section 19(1)(f) is especially significant.
It empowers the Magistrate:
“To secure same level of alternate accommodation for the aggrieved person as enjoyed by her in the shared household or to pay rent for the same, if the circumstances so require.”
The legislature could not have expressed the alternative more clearly.
Parliament itself contemplated that the woman’s statutory right may, in an appropriate case, be protected by alternate accommodation.
If physical residence in the disputed premises were invariably mandatory, Section 19(1)(f) would have very little practical purpose.
Statutory interpretation does not ordinarily permit a court to treat an express legislative provision as decorative.
Section 19(1)(f), therefore, must be given meaningful operation.
4. SATISH CHANDER AHUJA: THE SHARED HOUSEHOLD IS A BROAD CONCEPT
The Supreme Court’s judgment in Satish Chander Ahuja v. Sneha Ahuja, (2021) 1 SCC 414, is central to understanding the modern law of residence under the Domestic Violence Act.
The Court reconsidered the restrictive interpretation of “shared household” adopted earlier in S.R. Batra v. Taruna Batra and recognised that the statutory concept cannot be confined merely to property owned or rented by the husband.
The decision substantially strengthened the statutory protection available to women.
But there is an important point which sometimes gets lost in the discussion.
Expanding the definition of shared household does not make Section 19(1)(f) redundant.
The Supreme Court recognised the importance of balancing the woman’s statutory right of residence with the realities of competing claims concerning the property. The Court also acknowledged the availability of alternate accommodation under Section 19(1)(f), subject to appropriate safeguards.
That is a crucial distinction.
The law may recognise a particular property as a shared household.
But the remedy fashioned by the court need not invariably mean that the woman must physically occupy that particular property.
The question remains:
How is her right to residence best secured in the circumstances of the case?
5. SABAH SAMI KHAN: A PRACTICAL JUDICIAL ANSWER
For practitioners in Maharashtra, the Bombay High Court’s judgment in Sabah Sami Khan v. Adnan Sami Khan, 2011 (1) ALL MR 841, is particularly instructive.
The Court directly considered the interplay between the wife’s right to reside in the shared residence and the alternative contemplated by Section 19(1)(f).
The Court observed that the wife’s possession in the shared residence could be protected under clauses (a) to (e), but alternatively residence could be provided under clause (f).
The Court went further.
Where a reasonable offer of alternate accommodation is made and the court finds that the offer complies with Section 19(1)(f), the court held that an order under Sections 19(1)(a), (b) or (c) need not necessarily be passed.
The judgment therefore provides an important practical principle:
A reasonable offer of suitable alternate accommodation can satisfy the statutory requirement of residence.
The facts are worth remembering.
The husband offered separate flats for the wife’s residence. The Court emphasised that the accommodation had to be unencumbered and exclusively available to her.
The Court also made the important observation that the right under Section 19 was protective and enabling; it was not concerned with equal distribution of the husband’s property between the spouses.
That distinction remains extremely relevant.
A residence proceeding is not a partition suit wearing matrimonial clothing.
6. WHAT DOES “SAME LEVEL” MEAN?
This is perhaps where the real difficulty lies.
Section 19(1)(f) does not merely say “alternate accommodation.”
It says:
“same level of alternate accommodation.”
That expression has to mean something.
A husband cannot realistically say:
“My wife was living in a three-bedroom apartment, but I have arranged a single room in a distant locality. It has a roof, so technically the requirement is satisfied.”
The law is not so easily fooled.
The expression requires a meaningful comparison.
THE COURT MAY CONSIDER:
i. The size and nature of the original accommodation;
ii. The locality;
iii. The basic amenities available;
iv. Safety and security;
v. Privacy;
vi. Accessibility;
vii. The standard of living enjoyed during the relationship;
viii. The needs of children;
ix. The financial capacity of the parties;
x. Whether the alternate premises are actually available;
xi. Whether the premises are free from encumbrances; and
xii. Whether the accommodation is genuinely available for the woman’s exclusive and peaceful occupation.
The comparison, however, cannot be reduced to square feet.
A residence is more than a measurement on an architect’s drawing.
A smaller but secure, independent and suitably located apartment may, in appropriate circumstances, constitute accommodation of the same level.
The test must therefore be practical rather than mechanical.
7. THE RIGHT OF RESIDENCE IS NOT A PROPERTY SETTLEMENT
This is another area where matrimonial litigation can become conceptually confused.
A residence order under the Domestic Violence Act does not determine ownership.
It does not transfer title.
It does not distribute the husband’s estate.
It does not give the wife an ownership interest merely because she has been permitted to reside in the property.
The Bombay High Court in Sabah Sami Khan correctly emphasised that the statutory right was protective and enabling rather than an instrument for equality in distribution of the husband’s assets.
That principle deserves emphasis.
The court is not deciding:
“Which spouse deserves this property?”
The court is deciding:
“What residential arrangement is necessary to protect the aggrieved woman’s statutory rights?”
Those are two very different questions.
8. THE RECENT DELHI HIGH COURT DECISION: REENA GROVER V. RAMESH GROVER
The issue has acquired renewed significance with the Delhi High Court’s judgment dated 9 February 2026 in Reena Grover v. Sh. Ramesh Grover & Ors., Crl. M.C. No. 8722 of 2024.
The judgment provides a useful contemporary illustration of the principle.
The petitioner had previously resided in the Green Park property but subsequently shifted to another property belonging to the respondent at Safdarjung Enclave.
The dispute ultimately centred upon whether she could insist upon restoration to the Green Park premises.
The Delhi High Court examined Section 17 and Section 19 and held that the object of the residence provisions is protective and remedial. The Court observed that the statute does not confer an indefeasible right upon an aggrieved woman to insist upon residence in a particular property when suitable alternate accommodation of the same standard is available and offered.
The Court further found, on the facts before it, that the petitioner was not roofless and that she had a settled residence at the alternate property.
Consequently, the Court declined to direct restoration to the Green Park property.
This judgment is important not because it diminishes Section 17.
It is important because it demonstrates that Section 17 and Section 19 must be read together.
9. THE FACTS OF REENA GROVER MATTER
The decision also demonstrates why facts matter enormously in residence litigation.
The Court noted that the petitioner had voluntarily shifted to the Safdarjung Enclave property and had thereafter established her residence there.
The Court therefore found that the circumstances did not demonstrate forcible dispossession or that the petitioner had been rendered roofless.
This is an important qualification.
A woman who is forcibly expelled from a shared household and left without shelter stands on an entirely different footing from a woman who has voluntarily moved to another suitable residence and later seeks re-entry into the former premises.
The court must therefore examine the circumstances of departure.
Was she thrown out?
Did she leave voluntarily?
Was the movement temporary?
Did she establish a permanent alternative residence?
Was the alternative accommodation actually available to her?
Was there a genuine safety concern?
These questions cannot be answered merely by looking at the address on the matrimonial invitation card.
10. RAJNESH V. NEHA AND FINANCIAL REALITY
The Supreme Court’s judgment in Rajnesh v. Neha, (2021) 2 SCC 324, provides another important dimension.
The Supreme Court’s comprehensive directions concerning maintenance also recognised the practical relationship between residence and financial resources.
Where alternate accommodation is directed, the financial capacity and needs of the parties cannot be ignored.
A court may direct the respondent to secure suitable accommodation or pay appropriate rent.
This becomes particularly relevant where the husband does not own another property.
In such a case, the statutory remedy need not become impossible merely because there is no vacant apartment waiting in the husband’s name.
The statute permits payment of rent.
The court can therefore fashion an order that is practical, enforceable and consistent with the woman’s right to residence.
11. ALTERNATE ACCOMMODATION MUST BE REAL, NOT ILLUSORY
This is perhaps the strongest safeguard against misuse of Section 19(1)(f).
An offer of alternate accommodation must be genuine.
If the husband says:
“I will provide a flat after I sell my existing property,”
the court must ask when that will happen.
If he says:
“I have a property, but my parents occupy it,”
the court must ask whether the wife will actually have exclusive possession.
If he says:
“She can stay in a one-bedroom apartment even though she previously lived in a spacious family home,”
the court must examine whether the accommodation genuinely satisfies the statutory standard.
The law does not permit the husband to convert Section 19(1)(f) into an eviction strategy.
The provision exists to secure residence—not to manufacture homelessness.
12. THE SAFETY DIMENSION
There is another reason why alternate accommodation may sometimes be the preferable remedy.
Suppose the wife alleges domestic violence not merely against her husband but against other members of the household.
Suppose those persons continue to live in the disputed premises.
Suppose there have already been police complaints, protection applications and repeated allegations of threats.
In such circumstances, sending the wife back into the same house may not necessarily advance the protective purpose of the statute.
Indeed, it may defeat it.
A residence order should not become an order requiring parties to continue living in circumstances that are demonstrably unsafe or incapable of peaceful coexistence.
The purpose of the Act is protection.
The court must therefore ask not merely:
“Can she legally reside there?”
but also:
“Would directing her to reside there actually protect her?”
That is a far more meaningful question.
13. THE IN-LAW PROBLEM
The problem becomes especially delicate where the shared household belongs to the parents of the husband.
The Supreme Court’s decision in Satish Chander Ahuja makes clear that ownership by the husband’s parents does not automatically exclude the property from the statutory concept of shared household.
But recognising a shared household does not mean that every conflict between the wife and elderly parents must necessarily be resolved by giving one side permanent control of the premises.
There may be cases where separate accommodation provides a more effective and humane solution.
This is particularly true where the continued co-residence of the parties has become impossible.
Courts must therefore balance:
i. The Woman’s Statutory Right;
ii. The Nature Of The Domestic Relationship;
iii. The Circumstances Of The Alleged Violence;
iv. The Rights Of Other Occupants;
v. Ownership And Possession Issues;
vi. Safety;
vii. Financial Resources; And
viii. The Feasibility Of Continued Co-Residence.
The Domestic Violence Act should be interpreted purposively—but purposive interpretation does not mean ignoring practical reality.
14. IS THE WIFE BOUND TO ACCEPT ANY ALTERNATIVE?
Certainly not.
The wife is entitled to challenge the adequacy of the proposed accommodation.
If the husband offers accommodation in a locality that is unsafe, inaccessible or wholly disproportionate to the standard of living enjoyed by the parties, the court can reject the offer.
Likewise, if the accommodation is subject to third-party claims, litigation or encumbrances, the court may be justified in refusing to treat it as suitable.
The wife is not required to accept whatever property the husband happens to point towards.
But the converse is equally true.
She cannot necessarily insist that the husband must surrender the exact premises in dispute if the court finds that suitable, same-level and secure alternate accommodation adequately protects her statutory right.
The correct test is therefore not:
“Does the wife like the alternative?”
Nor is it:
“Is the husband willing to provide anything at all?”
The correct test is:
“Does the alternative accommodation satisfy the statutory standard contemplated by Section 19(1)(f)?”
15. A Practical Judicial Checklist
In my view, whenever a court is asked to substitute alternate accommodation for residence in the disputed shared household, the following questions ought to be addressed:
1. Was the property genuinely a shared household? The statutory definition under Section 2(s) must first be considered.
2. What were the circumstances in which the woman left? A voluntary departure and forcible dispossession cannot be treated identically.
3. Is the proposed alternate accommodation actually available? A future promise is not accommodation.
4. Is it of the same level? The court should examine the overall quality and suitability of the residence.
5. Is it safe? Security is central to a protective statute.
6. Is it independent? The woman should ordinarily have genuine privacy and peaceful occupation.
7. Is it free from encumbrances? The accommodation should not be subject to competing claims which make her residence precarious.
8. Who pays? Where rent is contemplated, the order should clearly identify the obligation.
9. Are children involved? Their education, safety and welfare may affect what constitutes suitable accommodation.
10. Will the order actually reduce conflict? The best residence order is often one which protects the woman while preventing the matrimonial dispute from becoming a permanent residential war.

16. THE DANGER OF TURNING PROTECTIVE LEGISLATION INTO PROPERTY LITIGATION
There is a broader concern here.
Domestic violence proceedings are sometimes converted into proxy battles over property.
The wife says:
“This is my shared household.”
The husband says:
“This is my mother’s property.”
The mother-in-law says:
“This is my only home.”
The children say:
“We need peace.”
And the court is left with the unenviable task of deciding whether a statutory residence remedy has become a property dispute in disguise.
The recent Delhi High Court decision in Reena Groveris instructive on precisely this point. The Court found that, on the facts before it, the proceedings had substantially assumed the character of an inter se property dispute and that the petitioner was not roofless because suitable alternative accommodation was available.
That does not mean that property disputes can never coexist with domestic violence claims.
They obviously can.
It simply means that the court must remain conscious of the statutory purpose.
A residence proceeding under the Domestic Violence Act is not intended to become a general-purpose mechanism for deciding every dispute relating to immovable property.
17. THE REAL MEANING OF RESIDENTIAL DIGNITY
The most important word in this entire discussion may not be “house”.
It may be dignity.
The right of residence under the Domestic Violence Act is ultimately about ensuring that a woman is not rendered homeless, vulnerable or dependent upon the goodwill of persons against whom she has sought legal protection.
That right can be secured in different ways.
Sometimes by restoring her to the shared household.
Sometimes by securing exclusive occupation.
Sometimes by directing the husband to vacate.
And sometimes by providing another home.
The remedy must correspond to the circumstances.
The law does not become weaker because it permits different remedies.
It becomes stronger.
18. CONCLUSION: THE RULE OF LAW MUST BE PRACTICAL
After years of appearing before Family Courts and High Courts, I have come to appreciate one simple truth about matrimonial litigation:
A legally correct order that cannot work in real life is only half a judgment.
Section 17 gives an aggrieved woman a statutory right to reside in the shared household.
Section 19 gives the court the tools to make that right meaningful.
Section 19(1)(f), in particular, recognises that the protection of residence does not invariably require physical occupation of the particular premises claimed as the shared household.
The jurisprudence beginning with Satish Chander Ahuja, read with Rajnesh v. Neha, the Bombay High Court’s practical reasoning in Sabah Sami Khan, and the Delhi High Court’s recent decision in Reena Grover, demonstrates the importance of maintaining this distinction.
The principle can therefore be stated simply:
A woman has a statutory right to reside; she does not, in every circumstance, possess an indefeasible right to insist upon one particular property as the only means by which that right can be satisfied.
But the corollary is equally important:
Alternate accommodation must be genuine, suitable, secure, available and of the same level.
Anything less would reduce a substantive statutory right to a paper promise.
The court’s task is therefore not to decide which spouse “wins” the house.
It is to ensure that the law achieves what Parliament intended.
And that is where the rule of law becomes more than a phrase.
It becomes the discipline of applying a protective statute without converting it into either a weapon or a hollow formality.
In matrimonial litigation, we sometimes spend hours arguing about walls.
The better judgment is the one that remembers the human being behind them.
Because ultimately, the law is not protecting four walls.
It is protecting the dignity of the person who lives within them.

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