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This article has been researched and written by Advocate Aarun Chanda, who practices divorce law in Mumbai and Pune. It is intended solely for academic purposes and should not be construed as legal advice. Readers are encouraged to consult a qualified advocate specializing in divorce cases for professional legal guidance.

ABSTRACT
Few judgments in the history of Indian matrimonial jurisprudence have generated as much constitutional, social and legal discourse as the decision of the Supreme Court in Sarla Mudgal v. Union of India. Although the judgment is popularly remembered for its observations advocating a Uniform Civil Code under Article 44 of the Constitution, its true legal significance lies elsewhere. The decision fundamentally answered a pressing question confronting matrimonial courts across the country: whether a Hindu husband could evade the statutory mandate of monogamy by embracing Islam solely for contracting a second marriage without dissolving the first.

In this article, I examine the judgment not through the prism of political debate but from the standpoint of legal doctrine. In my view, the lasting contribution of Sarla Mudgal is the Court’s interpretation of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, in harmony with Section 494 of the Indian Penal Code. The Court recognised that personal law cannot be employed as an instrument to defeat statutory obligations, nor can conversion become a legal device to extinguish vested matrimonial rights acquired under one personal law. Equally significant is the

Court’s reaffirmation that the sanctity of marriage cannot depend upon the unilateral will of one spouse.
Drawing upon my experience in matrimonial litigation, I argue that Sarla Mudgal is less a judgment on religion than a judgment on the rule of law. The Supreme Court reaffirmed a principle that continues to govern family law today: every marriage derives its legal incidents from the law under which it was solemnised, and those incidents cannot be altered merely because one spouse subsequently chooses another faith.

1. INTRODUCTION
During more than three decades of practicing matrimonial law, I have repeatedly encountered one misconception that continues to surface in consultations and litigation alike. Many litigants genuinely believe that conversion of religion automatically dissolves an existing marriage. Others assume that by embracing another faith permitting polygamy, a spouse acquires an unrestricted legal right to marry again. Both assumptions are legally incorrect.

The Supreme Court decisively rejected these misconceptions in Sarla Mudgal v. Union of India, a decision that remains one of the cornerstones of Indian matrimonial jurisprudence. Yet, regrettably, public discussion of the judgment has largely revolved around its observations concerning the Uniform Civil Code, often overlooking its far more enduring contribution to statutory interpretation.

In my respectful opinion, the true ratio of Sarla Mudgal is not the Court’s appeal to Parliament to consider implementing Article 44 of the Constitution. Those observations, though important, are essentially recommendatory. The binding ratio lies in the Court’s construction of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, read together with Section 494 of the Indian Penal Code. The judgment establishes that a Hindu marriage survives conversion of one spouse; that conversion does not automatically dissolve the marital bond; and that a second marriage contracted after such conversion, without obtaining a decree of divorce, constitutes the offence of bigamy.

The decision also illustrates an important constitutional principle that often receives inadequate attention. Freedom of religion under Article 25 undoubtedly protects an individual’s right to adopt and practice a faith of choice. However, that freedom cannot be invoked to destroy civil rights already vested in another individual under an existing statute. Constitutional liberties cannot become instruments for defeating statutory obligations.

Viewed from this perspective, Sarla Mudgal is not a conflict between Hindu law and Muslim law. Nor is it a judicial preference for one personal law over another. Rather, it is a judgment about preserving the integrity of legal relationships created under a particular statutory regime. The Supreme Court consciously avoided entering theological debates and instead resolved the dispute by applying principles of statutory interpretation, legislative intent, and the rule of law.

This distinction is of immense practical importance. Matrimonial courts are not required to determine which religion offers superior matrimonial rights. Their task is considerably narrower. They must determine whether rights created under one legal system can be unilaterally extinguished by one spouse invoking another legal system. The Supreme Court answered that question in the negative.

As a practitioner, I consider this reasoning to be one of the strongest features of the judgment. Had the Court accepted the contrary proposition, every statutory marriage could have become vulnerable to unilateral dissolution through strategic conversion, rendering the legislative policy of monogamy under the Hindu Marriage Act virtually meaningless. The Court therefore protected not merely the interests of the individual wives before it, but the coherence and effectiveness of matrimonial legislation itself.

2. THE LEGAL LANDSCAPE BEFORE SARLA MUDGAL
To appreciate the significance of the Supreme Court’s reasoning, one must first understand the legal uncertainty that prevailed before 1995. Contrary to popular belief, Sarla Mudgal did not emerge in a legal vacuum. Rather, it represented the culmination of more than a century of judicial thought concerning conversion, marriage and personal law.

Long before the enactment of the Hindu Marriage Act, colonial courts consistently held that conversion of religion did not automatically dissolve an existing marriage. Decisions such as In re Ram Kumari, Budansa v. Fatima, Nandi v. The Crown, and Gul Mohammed v. Emperor rejected the proposition that apostasy could extinguish matrimonial obligations.

Although these decisions arose under different factual circumstances, they were united by a common principle: the legal consequences of marriage depended upon the law governing the marriage at the time of its solemnisation and not upon the subsequent religious choices of one spouse.

The Bombay High Court’s celebrated decision in Robasa Khanum v. Khodadad Bomanji Irani occupies a particularly important place in this evolution. Justice M.C. Chagla emphatically rejected the argument that one spouse could impose a newly adopted personal law upon another spouse who remained governed by the original law of marriage. His reasoning reflected a broader jurisprudential concern. If unilateral conversion were recognised as dissolving marriage, the stability of every matrimonial relationship would become contingent upon the fluctuating religious preferences of either spouse. Such a proposition, in his view, offended justice, equity and good conscience.

The Supreme Court extensively relied upon these authorities, not merely as historical precedents but as evidence of a remarkably consistent judicial philosophy. The Court observed that Indian courts had repeatedly resisted attempts to permit one spouse to evade matrimonial obligations through religious conversion. In doing so, the Court reaffirmed a doctrine that had been steadily developing for over a century.

This historical continuity deserves emphasis because it dispels a common misconception that Sarla Mudgal created entirely new law. In reality, the Supreme Court did not invent a novel principle. It consolidated and harmonised long-standing judicial precedents with the statutory framework introduced by the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955.

The enactment of the Hindu Marriage Act fundamentally altered the legal landscape. Unlike traditional Hindu law, the Act codified the institution of marriage and imposed statutory monogamy through Section 5(i). Simultaneously, it created an exhaustive code specifying the grounds upon which marriage could be dissolved. Conversion became one such ground under Section 13, but significantly, only as a ground enabling the innocent spouse to seek divorce through judicial intervention. Parliament deliberately refrained from providing that conversion itself would automatically terminate marriage.

In my opinion, this legislative choice lies at the heart of the Supreme Court’s reasoning. Had Parliament intended conversion to dissolve marriage automatically, it would have said so expressly. Instead, it required a judicial decree of divorce. The distinction is fundamental. Conversion may furnish a cause of action; it is not itself the legal event that dissolves marriage.

This careful legislative architecture became the foundation upon which the Supreme Court constructed its reasoning in Sarla Mudgal. The Court recognised that permitting automatic dissolution through conversion would effectively rewrite the Hindu Marriage Act and nullify Parliament’s deliberate decision to make judicial dissolution the exclusive method by which a Hindu marriage could come to an end.

3. THE SUPREME COURT’S INTERPRETATION OF THE HINDU MARRIAGE ACT: WHY CONVERSION DOES NOT DISSOLVE MARRIAGE
In my opinion, the greatest contribution of Sarla Mudgal does not lie in its observations on the Uniform Civil Code. Those remarks have understandably attracted public attention, yet they do not constitute the heart of the judgment. The enduring significance of the decision lies in the Court’s meticulous interpretation of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, and its reconciliation with Section 494 of the Indian Penal Code. The Court was confronted with a deceptively simple question: Can a Hindu husband, by embracing Islam, escape the statutory obligation of monogamy imposed by the Hindu Marriage Act?

The Court answered this question not by engaging in a comparative study of religions, but by applying settled principles of statutory interpretation. It treated marriage not merely as a personal relationship but as a legal status created by statute. Once that premise is accepted, the remainder of the Court’s reasoning follows with remarkable consistency.
The Court began by recognising that a Hindu marriage solemnised under the Hindu Marriage Act is not merely a religious ceremony. It is a legal institution regulated by statute. Rights and obligations arising from such a marriage are not left to individual preference; they are determined by Parliament. Consequently, no party can unilaterally alter those statutory incidents merely by changing his or her religion.

This reasoning reflects a broader principle of jurisprudence that rights created by legislation can ordinarily be modified or extinguished only in the manner prescribed by the legislation itself. The Court therefore approached the controversy as one involving statutory interpretation rather than theological doctrine.

A. SECTION 4: THE OVERRIDING EFFECT OF THE HINDU MARRIAGE ACT
The Court first examined Section 4 of the Hindu Marriage Act, which gives overriding effect to the Act over all pre-existing texts, customs and interpretations of Hindu law. Although this provision appears procedural, it possesses profound substantive importance.

Section 4 declares that once Parliament has legislated upon a particular subject relating to Hindu marriage, earlier personal law principles yield to the statutory framework. The Act becomes the exclusive source governing matrimonial rights and obligations.

In my respectful opinion, the Court rightly appreciated that Section 4 represents the legislative intent to replace uncertain customary practices with a uniform statutory regime. The Act was designed to introduce certainty, predictability and equality into Hindu matrimonial law. If a spouse were permitted to circumvent the Act simply by adopting another religion, the overriding character of Section 4 would become illusory.

The Court therefore interpreted Section 4 as preventing any indirect attempt to defeat the statutory policy of monogamy. The obligation imposed by the Act survives conversion because the marriage itself continues to derive its legal existence from the Act.

This interpretation is entirely consistent with the settled principle that legislation cannot be rendered ineffective by permitting individuals to accomplish indirectly what they cannot do directly.

B. SECTION 5: MONOGAMY AS A MANDATORY STATUTORY CONDITION
The Court next turned to Section 5(i), which requires that neither party should have a spouse living at the time of marriage.

This provision, in my opinion, embodies the legislative philosophy underlying the Hindu Marriage Act. Parliament consciously departed from the earlier personal law position by making monogamy the indispensable condition of a valid Hindu marriage.
The language employed by Parliament is mandatory rather than directory. It leaves no discretion to the parties. Nor does it recognise any exception based upon subsequent religious conversion.

The Court correctly observed that if conversion automatically entitled a Hindu husband to contract another marriage, Section 5 would become incapable of practical enforcement.

Every spouse wishing to contract a second marriage could simply adopt another religion for that limited purpose.

Such an interpretation would transform the statutory command into a matter of personal convenience.

The Supreme Court refused to attribute such an irrational intention to Parliament.

As the Court implicitly recognised, statutes should be interpreted in a manner that advances their purpose rather than defeats it. The object of Section 5 is unmistakable—to enforce monogamy. Any interpretation permitting easy circumvention of that objective would undermine the very foundation of the Act.

C. SECTION 13: CONVERSION AS A GROUND OF DIVORCE
Perhaps the most compelling aspect of the judgment is the Court’s interpretation of Section 13(1)(ii), which provides that conversion from Hinduism constitutes a ground upon which divorce may be sought.

The distinction drawn by the Court is both subtle and fundamental. Section 13 does not declare that conversion dissolves marriage. It merely confers upon the innocent spouse the right to approach the Court seeking dissolution. This distinction reflects deliberate legislative drafting. Parliament consciously rejected automatic dissolution. Instead, it preserved judicial supervision over the termination of marriage. In my experience, many litigants misunderstand this provision. They assume that once conversion takes place, the marriage
automatically ceases to exist. The Supreme Court emphatically rejected this misconception.

The Court observed that Parliament could easily have enacted automatic dissolution had it intended such a consequence. Instead, it insisted upon judicial intervention. That legislative choice cannot be ignored by the judiciary. Accordingly, conversion merely creates a cause of action. It does not itself dissolve the matrimonial bond. This interpretation also protects procedural fairness. If conversion itself dissolved marriage, the innocent spouse would lose valuable statutory rights without notice or judicial determination. Such an outcome would be fundamentally inconsistent with principles of natural justice.

D. SECTIONS 11 AND 15: THE EXCLUSIVE METHOD OF CONTRACTING A SECOND MARRIAGE
The Court further examined Sections 11 and 15 to determine when parties become legally entitled to remarry.
Section 15 assumes particular importance because it expressly authorises remarriage only after a decree of divorce has attained finality.

The legislative sequence is unmistakable:
i. A valid marriage subsists.
ii. A competent court grants a decree of divorce.
iii. The decree becomes final.
iv. Only thereafter may either party contract another marriage.

No intermediate step is contemplated. No exception is created for conversion. The Court therefore concluded that Parliament intended judicial dissolution to remain the exclusive gateway to remarriage. In my opinion, this reasoning demonstrates the Court’s commitment to preserving legislative coherence. Individual provisions of a statute cannot be interpreted in isolation. They must be read as parts of an integrated legislative scheme.

When Sections 5, 13 and 15 are read together, only one conclusion is possible: conversion alone cannot terminate a Hindu marriage.

4. THE INTERPRETATION OF SECTION 494 IPC: THE REAL RATIO OF SARLA MUDGAL
The Court’s interpretation of Section 494 of the Indian Penal Code constitutes, in my respectful opinion, the true ratio decidendi of the judgment.
Section 494 punishes a person who marries again during the lifetime of his or her spouse where the second marriage is void because of the subsistence of the first marriage. The principal argument advanced before the Court was ingenious.

It was contended that once a Hindu embraced Islam, the Hindu Marriage Act ceased to apply. Consequently, the second marriage, though permissible under Muslim personal law, could not be regarded as “void” for purposes of Section 494.

Had the Court accepted this argument, every Hindu spouse could have escaped criminal liability merely by adopting another religion before contracting a second marriage. The Court declined to permit such an abuse of law. Instead, it adopted what may properly be described as a purposive interpretation of Section 494. The Court recognised that the expression “void” occurring in Section 494 IPC cannot be confined to the technical definition contained in Section 11 of the Hindu Marriage Act.

The two statutes serve entirely different purposes.
i. Section 11 determines matrimonial validity within the framework of the Hindu Marriage Act.
ii. Section 494 protects society against the offence of bigamy.

Consequently, the expression “void” must receive an interpretation consistent with the object of criminal law.

The Court therefore held that any marriage contracted in violation of the mandatory statutory prohibition against remarriage during the subsistence of an earlier marriage is void for purposes of Section 494.

I consider this to be one of the most sophisticated exercises in statutory interpretation undertaken by the Supreme Court. Rather than mechanically importing definitions from one statute into another, the Court examined the purpose underlying each enactment. It recognised that identical expressions may legitimately receive different meanings depending upon statutory context. This approach is firmly rooted in accepted principles of interpretation. Words derive meaning not from dictionaries alone but from legislative purpose.

THE COURT’S REJECTION OF LEGAL EVASION
Perhaps the strongest feature of the judgment is the Court’s refusal to legitimise what was plainly an attempt to evade statutory obligations. The Court repeatedly observed that conversion undertaken solely for the purpose of contracting another marriage constitutes an abuse of legal process. Significantly, the Court did not question the sincerity of genuine religious conversion. Nor did it hold that conversion itself is unlawful.

Instead, it distinguished between the constitutional freedom to change one’s religion and the civil consequences arising from an existing marriage. This distinction deserves careful emphasis. Every citizen possesses the fundamental right to profess and practise a religion of choice. However, that constitutional freedom does not carry with it a corresponding right to extinguish vested civil obligations owed to another person. In my view, this represents the most enduring contribution of Sarla Mudgal.

The judgment protects religious liberty while simultaneously preserving the rule of law. It recognises that constitutional freedoms and statutory responsibilities must coexist harmoniously rather than operate at the expense of one another.

5. JUSTICE, EQUITY AND GOOD CONSCIENCE: THE JURISPRUDENTIAL FOUNDATION OF SARLA MUDGAL
One aspect of Sarla Mudgal that deserves far greater scholarly attention is the Supreme Court’s reliance on the doctrine of justice, equity and good conscience. While much has been written about the Court’s observations on Article 44 of the Constitution, comparatively little attention has been paid to the jurisprudential principle that actually shaped the Court’s reasoning.

In my respectful opinion, the judgment is remarkable because the Court refused to allow a purely technical interpretation of personal law to defeat substantive justice. Instead, it reaffirmed that where two competing legal systems appear to intersect, the Court must interpret them in a manner that preserves fairness, legal certainty and the legitimate expectations arising from an existing marriage.

This principle has deep roots in Indian jurisprudence. Long before codified matrimonial statutes were enacted, colonial courts repeatedly invoked justice, equity and good conscience whenever rigid adherence to personal law produced manifest injustice. The doctrine was never intended to override legislation. Rather, it functioned as an interpretative guide whenever competing legal principles threatened to undermine fairness.

The Supreme Court adopted precisely this approach. It recognised that permitting unilateral conversion to dissolve matrimonial obligations would produce results wholly inconsistent with justice.

A. THE CONTINUING RELEVANCE OF ROBASA KHANUM
Among the numerous authorities cited in Sarla Mudgal, none is more significant than the decision of the Bombay High Court in Robasa Khanum v. Khodadad Bomanji Irani.

As a practitioner before courts in Maharashtra, I have always regarded Justice M.C. Chagla’s reasoning in Robasa Khanum as one of the finest illustrations of principled judicial analysis in family law. Justice Chagla posed a deceptively simple question. Can one spouse, by changing his or her religion, compel the other spouse to accept an entirely different legal system governing their marriage? His answer was emphatic. The marriage was entered into under one personal law. Its incidents were determined by that law. Neither spouse could unilaterally substitute another legal regime merely because of a subsequent change of faith. The Supreme Court in Sarla Mudgal expressly approved this reasoning. In doing so, it reaffirmed an important proposition that extends well beyond matrimonial law. A legal relationship cannot ordinarily be altered by the unilateral act of one party where such alteration prejudicially affects vested rights of another. This is a principle recognised throughout private law. Contractual obligations cannot ordinarily be varied by one party alone. Property rights cannot ordinarily be extinguished unilaterally. Likewise, matrimonial rights created under statute cannot be destroyed by the independent decision of one spouse to adopt another religion.

B. MARRIAGE AS A SOURCE OF VESTED CIVIL RIGHTS
Perhaps the most persuasive feature of the judgment is the Court’s recognition that marriage creates enforceable civil rights. Too often, matrimonial disputes are discussed exclusively in religious or emotional terms. The Supreme Court consciously avoided that approach. Instead, it viewed marriage as creating a legally protected status. That status carries numerous civil consequences.
The wife acquires rights relating to:
i. Consortium,
ii. Maintenance,
iii. Inheritance,
iv. Legitimacy of children,
v. Succession,
vi. Matrimonial reliefs,
vii. Residence,
viii. And protection against bigamy.

These rights are not mere moral expectations. They are statutory entitlements. Consequently, the husband cannot extinguish them merely by embracing another religion. In my opinion, this reasoning demonstrates the Court’s commitment to protecting substantive legal rights rather than merely enforcing religious norms. The judgment is therefore fundamentally a decision concerning civil justice. Religion forms part of the factual background. It is not the legal basis of the decision.

C. THE DOCTRINE AGAINST FRAUD ON STATUTE
Although the Supreme Court did not repeatedly employ the expression “fraud on statute,” its reasoning unmistakably reflects that doctrine. A fraud on statute occurs when a person seeks to achieve indirectly what legislation expressly prohibits. The Hindu Marriage Act mandates monogamy. If a Hindu husband cannot lawfully contract a second marriage while the first subsists, he cannot accomplish precisely the same result merely by first changing his religion. Otherwise, statutory prohibitions become meaningless. The Court therefore looked beyond the formal act of conversion and examined its legal consequences. This approach reflects another settled principle of statutory interpretation. Courts are concerned not merely with form but with substance. If legal rights could be defeated through formalistic devices, legislative purpose would invariably be frustrated. In matrimonial litigation, this principle assumes enormous practical significance. Family courts frequently encounter transactions designed to avoid statutory obligations—sham settlements, artificial transfers of assets, collusive divorces and strategic jurisdictional manoeuvres. Sarla Mudgal stands as an early affirmation that courts must examine the substance of such arrangements rather than merely their external form.

6. ARTICLE 25 AND ARTICLE 44: DID THE SUPREME COURT CREATE A CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICT?
No discussion of Sarla Mudgal is complete without addressing the constitutional observations relating to Articles 25 and 44. Unfortunately, this portion of the judgment has often generated more political commentary than legal analysis. In my respectful view, the constitutional discussion has sometimes overshadowed the actual ratio decidendi. The Court undoubtedly lamented the continued non-implementation of Article 44. It observed that a Uniform Civil Code could eliminate many conflicts arising from divergent personal laws. These observations have subsequently become the most frequently quoted passages of the judgment. Yet it is essential to distinguish between binding judicial reasoning and constitutional observations made in the nature of recommendations.

The actual dispute before the Court did not require implementation of a Uniform Civil Code. The Court resolved the controversy entirely through existing legislation. The Hindu Marriage Act supplied the answer. Section 494 IPC completed the statutory framework. The controversy could therefore be decided without invoking Article 44 at all. This distinction is important for lawyers and scholars. The ratio decidendi concerns conversion and bigamy. The observations regarding the Uniform Civil Code constitute obiter dicta, albeit observations of considerable constitutional importance.

A. FREEDOM OF RELIGION IS NOT ABSOLUTE
The Court also examined Article 25 of the Constitution. In doing so, it carefully avoided suggesting that citizens lack the freedom to change their religion. On the contrary, the judgment implicitly recognises that conversion is constitutionally protected. The difficulty arises only when conversion is invoked as a means of defeating pre-existing legal obligations. The Constitution guarantees freedom of conscience. It does not guarantee freedom from statutory duties. This distinction, in my opinion, lies at the heart of the judgment. Every individual enjoys complete liberty to profess a religion. However, no individual acquires a constitutional right to destroy another person’s civil rights merely by exercising that liberty. The Court therefore harmonised Articles 25 and 44 rather than treating them as competing provisions. Religious freedom remained fully protected. The statutory obligation of monogamy remained equally enforceable. Both constitutional values were preserved.

B. WAS THE COURT LEGISLATING?
Some critics have argued that the Supreme Court effectively legislated by expanding the scope of Section 494 IPC. I respectfully disagree. The Court neither created a new offence nor imposed a new disability. It merely interpreted existing legislation in light of its object and purpose. Had the Court accepted the contrary interpretation, Section 494 would have become practically unenforceable against a significant class of offenders. Parliament could scarcely have intended such an anomalous result. The Court therefore performed its traditional judicial function of construing legislation purposively rather than mechanically. Far from legislating, it preserved legislative intent.

7. THE SUBSEQUENT AFFIRMATION IN LILY THOMAS V. UNION OF INDIA
If any doubt remained regarding the correctness of Sarla Mudgal, it was dispelled four years later by the Supreme Court in Lily Thomas v. Union of India. That judgment is frequently misunderstood as merely following Sarla Mudgal. In reality, it performs a much more important function. It reinforces the doctrinal foundations of the earlier decision. The Court categorically reaffirmed that conversion to Islam does not dissolve a marriage solemnised under the Hindu Marriage Act. Until a decree of divorce is obtained from a competent court, the first marriage continues to subsist. Consequently, any second marriage contracted after conversion attracts criminal liability for bigamy.

More importantly, Lily Thomas clarified that the issue is not whether Islam permits polygamy. The real question is whether a Hindu husband can evade obligations imposed by the Hindu Marriage Act through unilateral conversion. The answer remained an unequivocal no. In my opinion, Lily Thomas transformed the principles laid down in Sarla Mudgal from a landmark judgment into settled law.

Thereafter, matrimonial courts across the country acquired a clear and consistent legal framework for dealing with such disputes.

8. A CRITICAL APPRAISAL OF SARLA MUDGAL: STRENGTHS, LIMITATIONS AND ENDURING RELEVANCE
Nearly three decades after it was decided, Sarla Mudgal continues to influence matrimonial jurisprudence in India. In my view, this enduring relevance stems not from its observations on the Uniform Civil Code but from the Court’s principled insistence that statutory obligations cannot be defeated by unilateral acts of one spouse. While the judgment has occasionally attracted criticism for its constitutional observations, its interpretation of the Hindu Marriage Act and Section 494 IPC has stood the test of time and was subsequently reaffirmed in Lily Thomas v. Union of India.

As a practitioner who has appeared in numerous matrimonial disputes involving allegations of bigamy, cruelty and fraudulent conduct, I find that Sarla Mudgal remains one of the most frequently misunderstood judgments. Many assume that the Court decided a religious issue. In reality, the Court decided a statutory issue with constitutional overtones. This distinction is crucial.

A. THE JUDGMENT PROTECTED THE RULE OF LAW RATHER THAN A PARTICULAR RELIGION
One of the recurring criticisms of Sarla Mudgal is that it favoured one personal law over another. With respect, such criticism overlooks the legal foundation of the judgment.
The Supreme Court did not hold that Muslim law permitting polygamy was invalid. Nor did it question the right of Muslims, governed by Muslim personal law from the inception of their marriage, to be regulated by that personal law.

The Court addressed a completely different issue. The parties before it had voluntarily entered into marriages governed by the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. Parliament had attached specific legal consequences to those marriages, one of which was compulsory monogamy. The Court merely held that those statutory consequences could not be avoided by subsequently invoking another personal law.

In my opinion, this distinction demonstrates judicial restraint rather than judicial activism. The Court refrained from commenting on the merits of competing personal laws and confined itself to enforcing the legislative policy chosen by Parliament for marriages solemnised under the Hindu Marriage Act.

B. PROTECTION OF THE RIGHTS OF THE FIRST WIFE
Another enduring contribution of Sarla Mudgal lies in its recognition of the legal rights of the first wife.

Family law is not concerned solely with regulating marital conduct. It also protects legitimate expectations created by marriage. A wife who enters into a monogamous marriage under the Hindu Marriage Act does so with the assurance that the law will protect her against the husband contracting another marriage during the subsistence of the first.
Had the Supreme Court accepted the husband’s argument, that assurance would have become meaningless. Every husband seeking to avoid the consequences of monogamy could simply adopt another religion, contract a second marriage and leave the first wife without an effective remedy. The Court recognised that such an interpretation would reduce statutory protection to a mere illusion. In my respectful opinion, the judgment therefore advances not only legal certainty but also substantive gender justice. It ensures that statutory rights conferred upon one spouse cannot be extinguished by the unilateral conduct of the other.

C. THE JUDGMENT DOES NOT PROHIBIT GENUINE RELIGIOUS CONVERSION
Perhaps the most persistent misunderstanding surrounding Sarla Mudgal is the belief that the Court discouraged conversion from one religion to another. Nothing could be further from the ratio of the judgment. The Court never questioned the constitutional freedom guaranteed under Article 25. It accepted that every individual possesses the liberty to adopt and profess a religion of choice. The Court objected only to the use of conversion as a legal mechanism to evade existing matrimonial obligations. This distinction is fundamental. A person may genuinely convert because of sincere religious conviction. Such conversion remains fully protected under the Constitution. However, that conversion does not automatically terminate rights already vested in another spouse under an existing marriage.

The constitutional freedom to change one’s faith does not carry with it a corresponding freedom to disregard obligations imposed by statute. This careful balancing of competing constitutional values, in my opinion, reflects the maturity of the Court’s reasoning.

9. THE POSITION UNDER THE BHARATIYA NYAYA SANHITA, 2023
Although Sarla Mudgal interpreted Section 494 of the Indian Penal Code, its reasoning remains relevant under the contemporary criminal law framework.

The Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, has repealed the Indian Penal Code. However, the legislative policy criminalising bigamy in circumstances recognised by law has substantially continued. The principles governing the subsistence of marriage under the Hindu Marriage Act have not undergone any corresponding change.

Accordingly, the central proposition established in Sarla Mudgal continues to hold good:
i. A marriage solemnised under the Hindu Marriage Act subsists until dissolved by a competent court.
ii. Conversion of religion does not automatically dissolve such marriage.
iii. A spouse cannot rely upon conversion to avoid statutory obligations arising from that marriage.

Consequently, while practitioners must now refer to the relevant provisions of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita in place of Section 494 IPC, the doctrinal reasoning of Sarla Mudgal remains unaffected.

This illustrates an important point often overlooked in legal writing. Landmark judgments frequently outlive the statutes under which they were delivered because the underlying principles of interpretation continue to guide courts even after legislative renumbering or codification.

10. PRACTICAL LESSONS FOR MATRIMONIAL PRACTITIONERS
In my experience, Sarla Mudgal offers several practical lessons for advocates conducting matrimonial litigation.

First, allegations of conversion must never be viewed in isolation. The real inquiry is whether the first marriage continues to subsist. If no decree of divorce has been obtained under the Hindu Marriage Act, conversion alone cannot justify a subsequent marriage.

Secondly, practitioners should carefully distinguish between a genuine change of faith and conversion relied upon merely as a defence in matrimonial proceedings. The constitutional validity of conversion is rarely the issue. The legal consequences flowing from an existing marriage are.

Thirdly, pleadings alleging bigamy should clearly establish:
i. The validity of the first marriage,
ii. Its continued subsistence,
iii. Absence of any decree of divorce,
iv. And the subsequent marriage during the lifetime of the first spouse.

These elements remain essential irrespective of the religious identity adopted by the parties after marriage.

Fourthly, advocates should avoid treating Sarla Mudgal as merely a constitutional precedent on Article 44. In day-to-day practice, its greatest utility lies in questions concerning the subsistence of marriage, the interpretation of the Hindu Marriage Act and the consequences of remarriage without lawful dissolution.

11. CONCLUSION
Few judgments illustrate the harmony between statutory interpretation and constitutional principle as effectively as Sarla Mudgal v. Union of India. The decision did not rewrite personal law. It reaffirmed that Parliament, through the Hindu Marriage Act, had created a comprehensive statutory code governing marriages solemnised under that enactment, and that its provisions could not be nullified by unilateral religious conversion.

In my respectful opinion, the enduring legacy of Sarla Mudgal lies in three propositions. First, marriage is a legal status carrying statutory rights and obligations that cannot be extinguished except in the manner prescribed by law.

Secondly, the freedom to change one’s religion, though constitutionally protected, cannot be transformed into a device for defeating civil obligations owed to another spouse.
Thirdly, courts must interpret personal law and statutory law harmoniously so that neither becomes an instrument for legal evasion or injustice. The judgment also demonstrates the Supreme Court’s commitment to purposive interpretation. Rather than allowing literalism to frustrate legislative intent, the Court construed the Hindu Marriage Act and the penal law in a manner that preserved both the sanctity of marriage and the integrity of the statutory scheme.

The debate on a Uniform Civil Code will undoubtedly continue in constitutional and political forums. However, irrespective of one’s views on that larger issue, the legal principles established in Sarla Mudgal remain firmly embedded in Indian matrimonial jurisprudence. The decision is not merely about conversion or bigamy; it is about the rule of law itself. It reminds us that no individual, however genuine the change in personal belief, can unilaterally rewrite the legal consequences of a marriage created under statute.
For matrimonial practitioners, the case remains indispensable—not because it settled a political controversy, but because it reinforced a timeless proposition: the obligations of marriage endure until law, and not unilateral choice, brings them to an end.

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